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The recent Microsoft case has brought spectacularly before the public’s attention the tension which 
exists between antitrust and copyright law
1. In fact intellectual property rights, even where not expressly 
invoked, have been the focal point of the judicial proceedings and remedies
2. In addition, charged with 
anti-competitive practices, Bill Gates’ company appealed directly to the exclusive rights conferred by 
copyright in his defence, pointing out the margin of uncertainty which exists between legitimate use of 
copyright and the protection of competition
3. 
An equally dramatic legal battle, in terms of intensity, unexpected reversals and duration, has been the 
Napster case which posed the opposite dilemma, raising the question of whether copyright enforcement, 
an apparently neutral and legitimate practice, can in reality become part of a strategy aimed at 
monopolising the market
4. Currently the case is in the pre-trial phase and will only be heard in one year's 
time
5.  Nevertheless, this has been enough to fan the flames of the debate, which in less dramatic but 
equally impassioned tones has been continuing in various settings
6.  
Generally speaking, the difficulty in analysing the interplay between competition and copyright law 
lies in fact that the two statutory frameworks contain both convergent and opposing elements, which 
render the final balance uncertain. The convergence lies in the stated “common purpose of promoting 
innovation and enhancing consumer welfare”
7: in fact both laws are based on the microeconomic 
principles of efficiency and are designed to avoid specific market failures. In this respect, therefore, 
copyright and antitrust laws are both equally aimed at maximising social w elfare. However, whereas 
antitrust law seeks to achieve this through the elimination of behaviours and practices that restrict 
competition, copyright pursues the same aim in the opposite way, by creating legal monopolies and 
altering the competitive paradigm. It is from the friction between these two different and opposing 
policies that the conflict can arise. 
This paper attempts to support the thesis that the framework of intellectual property rights is crucial to 
antitrust evaluations because there is a deterministic relation between property rights on the one hand, and 
market structure and modes of competition on the other. This consideration does not generally receive 
adequate emphasis in antitrust investigations. In particular, the analysis will adopt t he following 
perspective: antitrust aims to discourage behaviours which are incompatible with the competitive game 
and lead to inefficient outcomes. However, if the markets in question are not efficient or competitive, due Liuc Papers n. 114, ottobre 2002 
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to a particular statutory framework defined ex-lege, the entire question and its interpretation become less 
clear. And in this state of vagueness the distinction between what is legal and what is not becomes 
somewhat difficult to make.  This appears to be the case for copyright because, we will argue, by defining 
a precise system of incentives and barriers to entry, copyright sets up a market structure characterised by 
behaviours and outcomes which tend to deter efficiency and competition.  In such markets, as we shall 
detail below, competition is non-price and the industrial structure is normally that of a strongly 
concentrated oligopoly. In addition, there are peculiar characteristics such as network externalities on the 
demand side, stock and catalogue inertia effects on the supply side, which further distort the competitive 
game. All these aspects are in many ways deterrent and prejudicial to the existence of perfect 
competition, or of an innovation race in which many producers of many ideas confront each other. In fact, 
the configuration of such markets tends to foster not so much creative investments, as commercial 
investments (for instance, by means of sunk costs) which promote the emergence of dominant positions. 
In general, therefore, conducting a cost-benefit analysis, the outcome of copyright in terms of welfare 
becomes more uncertain than asserted by the traditional economic theory of intellectual property. 
Antitrust can contribute to re-balancing the situation described above. For example, it can prevent the 
application and the extension of copyright, with its negative side effects, where it is not necessary. 
However, there seems to emerge a fundamental contradiction between the two statutory frameworks, 
which have grown out of profoundly different economic and historical contexts  and operate in a 
completely different manner. In consequence, even though recourse to antitrust law in markets regulated 
by copyright can occasionally have beneficial effects, these effects are necessarily limited, and it would 
seem more appropriate to intervene on copyright itself, by directly altering the system of incentives which 
it creates.  
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 examines the main features of both copyright and 
competition law, with an in-depth discussion of the aims, structure, scope and effects on the market 
configuration of each legal framework. Section 3 proposes an evaluation of copyright law from the 
standpoint of competition, paying special attention to the system of incentives and the resultant 
behaviours adopted by copyright owners. Section 4 then addresses the difficult assessment of tying in the 
copyright sphere, while Section 5 attempts to formulate some policy recommendations. Finally, Section 6 
contains the concluding remarks. 
2. Competition and copyright: comparing two legal paradigms 
The first step in a discussion of the conflict between antitrust and copyright law is to address the 
differences between the legal paradigms, which have distinct origins, aims and structure.  In the following 
paragraphs we will attempt to clarify the reasons for this conflict, underlining in particular the different 
aspects and the - at times contradictory - impacts which these regulations can have on the economic 
scenario and on behaviours. Giovanni B. Ramello, Copyright and Antitrust Issues 
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2.1. Antitrust law 
It is important to note that, at the origin, the main motivation behind the institution antitrust 
law was political: i.e. to curb the influence of the powerful trusts that were emerging from the 
burgeoning industrial development of the United States
8. 
Therefore, even though a complex and sophisticated antitrust doctrine developed over the 
years, at the bottom it lacked an economic theory in support of antitrust law enforcement. Only 
in the 20
th century--in the decades of the '20s and '30s--did economists undertake the study of 
monopolistic competition, systematising oligopoly theory and, starting in the '50s, developing 
the first general model that could be used in antitrust proceedings (structure-conduct-
performance)
9.  Finally, during the last thirty years, with the establishment of t he Chicago 
school, antitrust actions became dominated by the criterion of economic efficiency. We can 
therefore say that the branch of economics research known today as Industrial Organisation (IO) 
is in large part the effect, rather than the cause, of the Sherman Act. 
Today, jurists and economists concur that antitrust is a tool for combating monopolistic 
behaviours which have the effect of excluding a segment of consumers from the market, relative 
to the competitive context. The law enforcement activity targets the behaviours of firms – given 
the structure of the markets – to induce them to engage in virtuous competition and thereby 
avoid a type of market failure.  
However we note that economic theory has not always provided judges with effective tools 
for detecting and punishing certain unlawful behaviours which impact negatively on consumer 
welfare. One of the most important  such instances is collusion: the legal action is still not 
adequately supported by economic tools which in fact offer judges criteria for efficiency that are 
still somewhat elementary
10.  
Although it recognises the importance of dynamic processes, such as technological change, 
economic doctrine mainly provides a consolidated theory of static efficiency, but not of 
dynamic efficiency. Consequently, even today antitrust policy still prevalently deals with static 
efficiency and markets
11. 
The long-run effects on welfare of acquisitions, joint ventures, vertical restrictions and even 
of certain ‘abuses’ of dominant position are quite uncertain, especially in new industries. And 
what's more, antitrust interventions are primarily referred to strategies relating to pricing. This 
perspective is a consequence of the law itself, but also of the economic theory, which offers 
models of product differentiation and non-price competition that are poorly utilizable in legal 
proceedings. Whereas it is known that strategies such as product differentiation and advertising, 
for example, characterise the competition in many markets, particularly in the service and 
information industries
12.  Liuc Papers n. 114, ottobre 2002 
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Summing up, therefore, the first point to be noted is the  structural weakness of the IO 
theory, with respect to the current needs of antitrust law in markets regulated by copyright. This 
weakness is probably attributable to the fact that this theory chiefly grew out of a study of the 
structure and dynamics of the manufacturing industries. And it has therefore produced analysis 
tools geared to that particular context
13.  Now this tools poorly apply to the markets of 
information goods protected by copyright, where the modes of competition differ significantly 
from those of the sectors which produce tangible goods.  
The final observation concerns the evolution and workings of antitrust law. Over the years 
the US antitrust model has spread to a great many countries, starting with Europe, thereby 
undergoing a process of partial internationalisation–so to speak
14.  Nonetheless, the legal 
underpinnings and the organisation of law enforcement activities are national in scope, even 
though  co-operation between different countries remains possible.  A world-wide antitrust 
framework does not yet exist, nor is this in itself necessary for the individual national antitrust 
laws to work. The globalisation of antitrust is as yet limited, and not strictly necessary, even 
though it is undoubtedly important. 
2.2. Copyright law 
It is interesting to note that copyright shares with antitrust the political motivations for its inception. In 
this case, however, the purpose of the law was to control – and if necessary censor – new information 
before it was put into circulation (Patterson, 1968, Chap. 2)
15. 
There were two guiding principles which characterised the development of copyright: technological 
dynamics and the evolution of markets. On the one hand, every stage of technological change has shaped 
the current framework of the law, which was originally conceived for literary texts, and subsequently 
extended to phonograms, computer programs and, most recently, to databases. On the other hand, the 
emergence of new economic interests has led to repeated amendments of the law, which have tended to 
favour the interests of producers (publishers) more than those of the authors
16. In the past few decades 
there has also been a gradual internationalisation of copyright – recently regulated within the WTO by the 
TRIPs agreements (1994) – and aimed at creating a statutory framework that is valid and applicable in the 
global marketplace
17. As we shall show below, the differences in scope of the laws – international for 
copyright versus national for antitrust – can give rise to ambiguity and conflict. 
Today, copyright protects original works of authorship, fixed in any tangible medium of expression. 
Ownership of the right grants the author or her licensee an exclusive right to the exploitation of the work 
through its reproduction, the distribution of copies, its public performance and the creation of derivative 
works. In addition to the above rights, which are of an economic nature, copyright also confers moral 
rights which are not, however, of practical relevance for the purposes of economic analysis
18. 
The theoretical justification for copyright law rests on the thesis of the ‘incentive to create’, and seeks 
to prevent a different type of market failure from that addressed by antitrust. In fact, because ideas are by Giovanni B. Ramello, Copyright and Antitrust Issues 
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their nature public goods – characterised by non rivalry in consumption and non exhaustibility, and by 
very low marginal costs of reproduction/diffusion – they can be easily imitated by free-riders who do not, 
however bear the production costs. This circumstance does not therefore permit the existence of an 
efficient market of ideas
19. Copyright is one artifice for converting copyrightable works into private goods 
and securing for creators appropriate profits deriving from their activity. In a manner significant for the 
economic analysis, it gives owners the right to exclude other individuals from accessing the protected 
information good, save upon payment of a price. In other words, it grants authors a statutory monopoly 
over the copyrightable work which they have created. This legal monopoly confers--at least potentially--a 
certain amount of market power to the copyright owner. It is worth noting that, although the mere 
existence of copyright does not necessarily per se confer significant market power to owners or their 
licensees, the success of a given item on the market and the exclusive exploitation of the right imply 
market power. This point needs to be made for several reasons. First, according to Nordhaus’ (1969) 
seminal contribution, the optimal incentive to create for the individual - not for the society (ref. Arrow, 
1962) - is represented by monopoly profit
20. In addition, a large part of the economic literature on 
copyright maintains the standard assumption of monopoly profits, and this will constitute the reference 
for the present work (Besen, 1986; Landes and Posner, 1989).  
Secondly, market power is conferred by the poor substitutability of most information goods
21. Note 
that this presumption is consistent with the assumption of the welfare enhancing effects of a variety of 
ideas. 
The specificity of individual information goods is indirectly recognised by copyright when it 
endeavours to encourage their creation. If copyrightable works were not so manifold and diverse, there 
would be no need to set up such a complex system of incentives. In other words, if information goods 
were near or perfect substitutes for each other–as would be necessary to cancel out the market power-due 
to their low marginal costs of reproduction and non exhaustibility there would be no need to produce a 
number of different ideas and the copyright mechanism wouldn’t make sense, since it would be easier and 
more affordable to provide direct incentive to only one (or a few) creators.  
Moreover, there is the objective fact that many goods are different from each other due to ‘natural’ 
differentiation effects, i.e. which depend on the specific nature of the information, such as its meaning 
and its symbolic value. The Bible is not a substitute for the Koran, but neither is a Spice Girls CD a 
substitute – other than a very poor one-for a recording of Pavarotti singing Umberto Giordano's Andrea 
Chénier
22. This type of differentiation is set in motion by specific characteristics of the preferences 
ordering and the action of complex phenomena such as network effects on the demand. 
The exogenous market power is then strengthened by the competitive strategy adopted by copyright 
owners and by the specific characteristics of the information goods. On the one hand industries producing 
such goods frequently exhibit special features such as economies of scope and scale and/or network 
externalities (i.e. economies of scale on the demand side) which confer market power in and of 
themselves, at least in the short-run. On the other hand, the production process of such goods often entails 
endogenous sunk costs which chiefly serve the purpose of differentiating items by quality (thereby 
creating market power) and which, according to the literature (Sutton, 1998; Carlton and Gertner, 2002), Liuc Papers n. 114, ottobre 2002 
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lead to highly concentrated markets in which a few firms hold significant market power
23. The empirical 
evidence confirms these assertions
24.  
All these characteristics, taken together, create a market structure that strongly steers the competitive 
behaviours of firms, and hence the performance of the market, in the direction of reduced 
competitiveness.  It is paradoxical that copyright, created to overcome the market failure arising from the 
existence of public goods, lays the groundwork for the market failure which is instead addressed by 
antitrust law
25.  
This fact introduces a fundamental difference between antitrust and copyright which must be taken 
into account. Whereas the former, given the property rights and market structure, simply targets the 
behaviours of firms by specifying what cannot be done, the latter defines the property rights, that is to say 
the goods and the market structure, creating a precise system of incentives
26. 
Therefore it is worth repeating that the framework of property rights is critical to antitrust evaluations: 
there is a deterministic relation between property rights on the one hand, and market structure and modes 
of competition on the other.  
3. Costs and effects of copyright: a different perspective 
The economic evaluation of copyright and its competitive impact requires a careful consideration of 
the costs. The standard theory of copyright set out in the preceding section rests on the assumption that 
the social cost of the monopoly granted by the right is effectively less than the expected benefits, with a 
positive balance that maximizes welfare. In other words, the static inefficiency associated with the 
monopolies granted by the right is offset by the expected dynamic efficiency resulting from the 
production of an optimal level of new ideas
27. However this assertion raises some questions, due to the 
rather perfunctory and narrow description which it gives of the sectors involved and the effects of 
copyright in shaping industrial configurations and behaviours.  
3.1 Added costs 
There is first of all the logical difficulty of accepting the concept of injecting a certain amount of 
inefficiency into an economic system today to promote only its possible efficiency tomorrow; this is in 
effect an anomalous passage for the economic theory, and worth paying attention to as of now. The 
desired outcome is not guaranteed, but rather lies in the ability "[to] achieve the proper balance between 
the incentive needed  to call forth productive activity, and the access to existing works upon which this 
activity builds” (Cotter, 1999, p.218). Therefore, for the purposes of creating the correct system of 
incentives for any given idea, category by category fine tuning would appear more appropriate. Instead, 
copyright today provides virtually identical protection to information goods that differ vastly in their 
nature and production costs, making it a rather coarse -- and not necessarily efficient - stimulus for 
creative activities. Indeed, the theory of the mechanisms has shown that for an incentive to function 
correctly it must be opportunely tailored to the production costs. Otherwise, the outcome will be Giovanni B. Ramello, Copyright and Antitrust Issues 
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haphazard. For example, if the incentive is higher than necessary, even ideas that are inefficient will be 
produced (Scotchmer, 1998). 
However, little consideration has been given to these aspects in the copyright field, not even for what 
concerns the correct use of parameters such as the scope and duration of the right (Barton, 1997). On the 
contrary, copyright grants equal protection to the most diverse ideas, with a duration that in many cases is 
as high as 70 years post mortem autoris (i.e. author’s life plus seventy years)
28-an arbitrary and decidedly 
excessive term for the purposes of incentive. 
Similarly, no consideration is given to the ‘incremental creation’ costs which result from monopolistic 
rationing. In fact, because creative processes inevitably follow a cumulative procedure–yesterday’s ideas 
become the inputs for the ideas of today
29--the rationing of ideas through copyright increases the costs for 
follow-on creators and excludes certain individuals from creative activities (Scotchmer, 1998)
30.  
And finally, there are the transaction costs generated by copyright. Some of these are classifiable as 
administrative costs, for example those connected with the set up and management of collecting societies 
(Landes and Posner, 1989; Gordon and Bone, 1999). Then there is the special category of legal costs and 
infringement monitoring costs–which are often overlooked despite their considerable impact on those 
operating in the market
31. It is important to note that, at times, the enforcement of a copyright depends 
precisely upon the owner’s ability to sustain such costs, and therefore the competitive process will also be 
affected by their existence. 
In short, it seems clear that the welfare impact of copyright will certainly be different if we include the 
above described costs in the evaluation. In some cases the outcome might even be negative, and the 
incentive will not work. This is a first, elementary (though important) conclusion. However it is not the 
main object of the argument. 
Rather, it is interesting to introduce a second observation: the implementation of copyright also 
produces the understandable side-effect of shaping the i ndustrial sectors involved, generally by 
weakening the degree of competition. The design of an incentive that is disproportionate to the needs, 
such as the copyright of today, with its duration of 70 years post mortem autoris, the elevation of costs for 
follow-on creators which tends to block the potential competitors of tomorrow, and the exponential 
growth of transaction costs which mean that copyright is only fully accessible to those able to sustain long 
and expensive legal battles-all this effectively indicates that there exists a cost dimension to copyright that 
is measured in terms of a gradual erosion of competitiveness.  
3.2 Variations on the theme of competition 
We reach the same conclusion if we examine the model of competition put forward by the economic 
theory of copyright. This is generally represented as a dynamic Schumpeter-style innovation race, which 
continually generates an efficient level of new copyrightable works. Through the expected profits, 
copyright creates an endless succession of winner-take-all (and competitive) races which inject an optimal 
quantity of  copyrightable works into the market
32.  
Nevertheless, this model does not truly fit the copyright industries. On closer examination, there is 
little dynamic about the proposed model, which is an intertemporal transposition of a static competition Liuc Papers n. 114, ottobre 2002 
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whose output is measured in terms of quantity of copyrights. For example, an innovation race 
presupposes the ongoing possibility of leapfrogging by competitors, who can therefore claim the reward 
at any time, irrespective of their history. But recent theoretical developments (Shapiro, 2000) have clearly 
shown how this is not the case for information industries where, on the contrary, pockets of monopoly 
power (which copyright creates) can be c ompetitively exploited to secure or reinforce monopolistic 
positions. This is borne out by the studies of specific industries, which have found that the majority of 
information goods markets follow a pathway of progressive concentration, at both the national and 
international levels
33. This dynamic can in part be explained by the existence of scale economies and 
scope economies on the supply side, and of network externalities on the demand side. But the excluding 
and self-reinforcing effects of copyright still contribute to creating and strengthening dominant positions 
and consolidations.  
The overall outcome of the described phenomena contributes to creating markets that bear little 
relation to the Schumpeterian characters-except perhaps during the first few rounds of the race
34 -and 
which instead exhibit all the symptoms of a weakened, or at any rate significantly altered competitive 
scenario
35.  One persistent trait is the existence of non-price competition, in which the sunk cost 
component has the dual role of consolidating and increasing demand and/or creating barriers to entry for 
potential competitors. A possible model for this scenario is for example a vertically differentiated 
oligopoly, in which the presence of sunk costs also explains the high degree of concentration
36. The 
leitmotiv of the strategies adopted by copyright owners is the attempt to strengthen market power.   
If we then combine differentiation practices with the inherently poor substitutability of goods 
protected by copyright, the effect is to create a peculiar competitive context in which price plays a limited 
role, exerted for the most part in relation to direct demand. 
Note that, the ‘natural’ differentiation of ideas and that effected by copyright strategies means that 
each information good can be interpreted-at least to some degree-as a ‘separate market’.  Therefore, the 
owner of several copyrights is, to a certain extent, in a similar position to a multi-product company or 
conglomerate, whose relationships with competitors are in good measure still ambiguous and in any case 
difficult to interpret
37.  
The nature of these behaviours is often precariously balanced between legitimacy and unlawfulness, 
and the standard IO still does not offer sufficiently robust tools for supporting antitrust  evaluations. 
Although--since US case United Shoe Machinery
38--the antitrust authorities have acknowledged, for 
example, that the accumulation of intellectual property rights (patents in this case), though legal in itself, 
can be used to suppress competition by creating barriers to entry and foreclosing competitors (Anderson, 
1998), and economic theory has backed up these findings with specific models
39, there is still no robust 
method for detecting and interpreting the alleged anti-competitive practices.  
In the following section we shall seek to extend this consideration to the copyright field.  
3.3 A simple model for altering the competitive paradigm 
Behind the interpretation of copyright as a pro-competitive tool lies the assumption that copyrightable 
works, once created, confront each other symmetrically in a competitive marketplace. In other words, the Giovanni B. Ramello, Copyright and Antitrust Issues 
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monopoly created by the right is temporary and disappears in a short time, whereas the innovation race is 
renewed at each step in a competitive manner (ref. for example Kingston, 1990). However the hypothesis 
of symmetry is not only unproven, but also misleading: to the extent that copyright provides an incentive 
in the form of a monopoly, it is rational for the owner to adopt behaviours aimed at strengthening and 
preserving the monopoly. But such behaviours cannot then be automatically deemed unlawful, since they 
take place within a sphere where competition is already restrained. While the success of one expression of 
idea over others may be the result of historical accident, the persistence of dominant firms is often a 
consequence of market imperfections which in our case are introduced by copyright (Williamson, 1977).  
To better understand this assertion, let us consider a simple model representing a market in which 
there exists a producer who, for whatever reason, has the exclusive faculty of producing a catalogue of 
copyrights characterised by conditions of uncertainty.  The reasoning set forth below is that this 
asymmetry, which is exogenous for the purposes of the analysis, can under certain structural conditions 
alter the competitive scenario to the advantage of the incumbent, to an extent that potentially creates 
barriers to entry.  
The stylised facts represent a static market in which the incumbent has  the ability to create a 
(horizontal) catalogue of n copyrights at time t0. Naturally, this reasoning can be extended to the dynamic 
case in which the incumbent has a stock of nt copyrights at times t= 1,2…T (a sort of vertical catalogue). 
In the static case, therefore, the incumbent creator has the ability to produce and distribute a catalogue 
n of information goods (
+ ￿ ˛ > n n   ,   1 ). This scenario, which is realistic for many information goods 
markets, might arise because the incumbent already operates in the market and therefore possesses skills 
and a production inertia that are impossible for a newcomer to match
40.  However there are no barriers to 
entry for a potential competitor, who can therefore enter but only producing a limited number of 
copyrights. For simplicity, only one. This hypothesis in effect reflects the reality of many information 
goods sectors in which new producers must necessarily start off with only one product.   
For simplicity, let us assume that for both contenders the production costs are zero, and that there are 
sunk entrance costs which are positive and constant (SC>0), i.e. which do not depend on the number of 
products put on the market. The simplest way to understand this hypothesis is to imagine that it 
corresponds to the creation of a distribution network. This is a sort of “admission ticket” to the market 
whose price does not vary significantly as a function of the number of copyrights produced
41. The ability 
to create a distribution network is crucial for entering the market
42. The difference in costs is necessary 
for representing the conjectured asymmetry between newcomers and incumbents in terms of skills and 
production inertia. The fact that SC does not change as a function of n can instead be interpreted as an 
extreme instance of subadditivity of the cost function, attributable for example to economies of scale 
and/or scope. 
Let us furthermore assume that all n+1 products have the same probability of success, defined as  
P(S)= 1-p, or of failure, defined as P(F)= p, with   1 0 < < p . The idea behind this hypothesis, in line 
with the structure of the information goods markets which, as mentioned previously, are generally 
vertically differentiated oligopolies, is that each product within a given quality segment has an 
approximately equal probability of success
43. Liuc Papers n. 114, ottobre 2002 
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Finally, the success (and hence the failure) events for each n+1 copyright are statistically independent, 
that is to say the success on the market of one title does not depend on the success or failure of the 
others
44. Note that this is the least favourable hypothesis for the incumbent, since it puts her copyrights on 
the same plane as those of the competitor. A further development of the analysis, which is not pursued 
here, could in any case examine different probability distributions, perhaps ascertaining whether they can 
be influenced by specific strategic behaviours. 
According to the standard economic theory of copyright cited above, the profit of each product in case 
of success will be PM  which represents the gross monopoly profit, that is to say  without still subtracting 
the costs SC. This profit is conjectured to be equal for each product
45. We therefore assume that each 
intellectual work is not in direct competition with the others, and that it faces its own demand curve. This 
condition follows from the observation, set out previously, that copyrightable works are considered poor 
substitutes for each other. And in any case it is consistent with the reality of the markets, in which firms 
offer catalogues and stocks with many titles. Such variety would not be rational if the different titles were 
interchangeable, because this would mean that the firms wish to engage in internal competition.  
If the producers of information goods are neutral to risk, they will seek to maximise the expected 
profits, that is to say the weighted mean of the probability of profit and loss, which therefore represents 
the incentive to create. Now it is clear that each n
th work, considered singly, will promise an expected 
profit given by: 
SC p E M M n - P - = P ) 1 ( ) (  
For the producer to have an incentive to create the item it is necessary to satisfy the participation 
constraint
46  
0 ) ( P ‡ PM n E  
where P0> 0 is the profit obtained from an alternative activity. If the above condition is met the 
information good will be produced and therefore the economic theory of copyright would appear to be 
validated: each idea created is promised an equal reward.  
However, if we consider the initial asymmetry, a substantially different picture emerges:  the new 
entrant will face a higher overall risk of failure than the incumbent, and this will substantially alter the 
system of incentives. In fact, because he produces only one item, her probability of failure, and hence of 
losing SC, will be that defined previously,  ( ) p F Pnc = . Conversely the probability of failure for the 
incumbent, thanks to the possibility of offering a catalogue, will be given by the joint probability of 




inc p F P F P = =￿
=
) ( ) (
1
 
which measures the probability that all n products will simultaneously fail.   Now, because the 
probability of failure of one item is p<1, the effective risk of loss for the new entrant is always greater 
than that faced by the incumbent, due to the initial asymmetry. The final order of probability will be as 
follows:  ( ) ( ) F P F P inc nc > , since p < p
n. Giovanni B. Ramello, Copyright and Antitrust Issues 
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The proposition is validated by the fact that the incumbent's risk of failing to cover the costs SC, given 
by the joint probability  ( ) F P inc , decreases with increasing numbers of copyrights, with the limiting case 
being that of an infinite number of titles. In this case  




+¥ ﬁ F P F P
n
i
n n inc  
This assertion appears consistent with the findings of other studies in the field
47.  
Note also that, in the scenario thus described, the production of a high number of copyrights answers 
the need to minimise risks. Consider for example the production of a large number of products. 
According to the above, this strategy increases the likelihood of success of at least one copyright, which 
represents the minimum probability of success.  
In the borderline case where the incumbent has an infinite number of products, the minimum 












n inc p F P P S P  with  1 ) ( lim =
+¥ ﬁ S Pinc n
. 
In this case, because at least one copyright will be successful, there exists a lower bound on the 
profits. This bound is of course given by the profit from exactly one successful copyright – i.e. the gross 
monopoly profit – minus the sunk costs. We can therefore state that the expected profit for an incumbent 
with an infinite catalogue is at least equal to the lower bound, i.e.: 
SC E M M inc - P ‡ P ) (  
Such profit satisfy the participation constraint, assure coverage of sunk costs and in general put the 
incumbent at an advantage with respect to new entrants.  
The situation described therefore confirms the preceding assertion: that the existence of asymmetries 
distorts the competitive model of the innovation race and favours the incumbent
48. The effective structure 
of the incentives is different from that which is assumed by the mainstream literature, that is to say there 
is an innovation race where every creator has an equal incentive. In actual fact, however, the ranking of 
incentives at least is as follows  0 ) ( ) ( 0 > ￿ > P > P M nc M inc E E .  
And hence a second consequence will follow from the consideration that the following new condition 
applies: 
M M SC p ￿ < < P - ) 1 (  
In this case the incumbent will produce her own copyrights and the newcomer will be kept out of the 
market. Now, if the condition is exogenous and depends on the state of nature there are no particular 
problems. If instead the costs SC are determined endogenously by the incumbent, the definition of a level 
of SC  for which  ) ( 0 ) ( 0 M nc M inc E E P > > P > P  is true would in practice effect a strategy of 
market foreclosure against the newcomer. Now, many authors have repeatedly observed strategies similar 
to that described, especially with regard  to distribution costs which require a high level of sunk 
investments
49.  Liuc Papers n. 114, ottobre 2002 
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We note also that the incumbent adopts an economic logic of cross-subsidy, which can introduce a 
certain degree of inefficiency into the market. For example, if we assume that the profits for the different 
items are variable, or that the success/failure probability distribution is different for each item, the 
consideration of joint profits by the incumbent will lead him to produce items which would not be 
produced in the Schumpeterian race. This peculiarity might explain, at least in part, the high rate of 
failure observed in many markets for information goods, even for large firms: the expectation of 
sufficiently high profits on a large catalogue can reduce efforts expended on the selection of the 
individual copyrightable works and the production of the individual titles. There is therefore also a risk of 
excessive differentiation. 
The scenario described also explains, on the one hand, the elevated birth/death rate of small newcomer 
enterprises and the stability of a small number of incumbents, and on the other hand the high level of 
concentration--phenomena which several authors have observed in industries for information goods
50. 
The progressive action of this mechanism tends to strengthen dominant positions and favours 
consolidation.  
Finally, it is important to note that diversification into other, often complementary, production sectors 
provides an opportunity to make new profits on secondary markets (consider the case of home videos or 
television rights for films), making it easier to recover the costs and possibly further reducing the risks
51.  
In this connection it has been observed (De Vany and Walls, 1996) that the existence of such practices 
can significantly alter the system of incentives, so that revenues from secondary markets become essential 
for permitting the production of certain items with a high production budget.  
On the one hand, therefore, diversification and cross-subsidy practices can constitute an optimal 
strategy to be adopted in situations of uncertainty. On the other hand, however, they significantly alter the 
competitive balance of the market. 
4. Product definition: the ambiguous case of tying arrangements 
Another sphere in which traditional antitrust analysis applied to information goods protected by 
copyright can come up against interpretative difficulties is that of tying arrangements. In fact, as shall be 
discussed below, in such a case the straightforward enforcement of antitrust law can even arbitrarily 
influence creative activities. 
The definition of tying arrangements refers to practices which force the purchaser of a given product 
to acquire another product in conjunction with it. Tying is deemed unlawful by antitrust law when the 
sellers have sufficient market power over the 'tying' product to restrict competition in the market of the 
'tied' product 
52. In this case, we speak of ‘leverage of tying’, because the strategy described is pursued 
with a view to monopolise a different market (Whinston, 1990, 2001). 
The application of this practice is relatively old, and there are historic antitrust cases which testify to 
its anti-competitive effects in the specific sector of copyright. In the celebrated Paramount Pictures case 
of 1948, the tied products were groups of films licensed to theatres by the major movie studios, and a 




53.  In both cases it was alleged that the combined sale of information goods had the purpose of 
foreclosing the market to competitors. But once again, this didn’t lead to the creation of robust analytical 
tools, while the interpretation of these practices in the digital domain can be even more ambiguous. 
Generally speaking, tying can be effected in two different ways, which are sometimes used jointly. In 
one case, the agreement is of a contractual nature: the parties explicitly or implicitly agree to the sale, and 
the buyer is forced to make the joint purchase (from which he may at times obtain a private benefit). By 
way of example, to stay within the information goods sector, this is what Microsoft has done by forcing 
computer manufacturers to install Internet Explorer in order to purchase licenses of the Windows 
operating system (and because the cost of the browser is zero, this entails no private cost to the 
purchaser).  
There is also a second, more technical formula for implementing tying which is achieved through the 
integration of products. In this case we speak of physical tying. This procedure can either render the two 
products complementary (e.g. a printer and its spare cartridge) or, in the case of intellectual property, it 
can create a new integrated product.  
In the literature, the competitive evaluation of this type of tying is uncertain because it can create 
value and hence not impact negatively on welfare (Whinston, 2001). Within the context of information 
goods, the evaluation is even more uncertain, also because of the effects which it can have on the 
innovation process.  
In the Microsoft case, for example, Bill Gates' decision to integrate the Internet Explorer browser into 
Windows was interpreted as physical tying of an anti-competitive character. This judgement was borne 
out by the concurrent existence of contractual tying.  
Now, without entering into the merits of the decision, we note that this interpretation effectively has a 
prejudicial flavour, inconsistent with the particular production context, and which even risks altering the 
structure of incentives created by copyright law.  
In fact, as those who have some programming experience will know, there are two schools of thought 
concerning the best architecture for a software program. At one extreme there is the ‘open’ architecture, 
consisting of a central interface ( an application) which controls a set of separate routines (other 
applications), while at the other extreme we have the ‘closed’ architecture, in which a single extended 
application encloses all the functions within itself. According to traditional antitrust analysis, these two 
systems are equivalent for the user; however they are not so for the author and the law, because the 
adoption of an open architecture can presuppose the creation of as many copyrights as there are 
components (for example, the popular Word software program incorporates within itself a spell-checker 
application, an editor for mathematical formulas, etc.), which makes it a form of contractual tying. What's 
more, it is possible for an originally open product to be subsequently converted into a closed product. 
This operation can be interpreted by the antitrust authorities as physical tying, with the ensuing anti-
competitive implications, as happened for Windows and Internet Explorer. However, because there are 
two different reasons why this practice might be implemented, one effectively anti-competitive while the 
other is pro-efficiency
54, the intervention of antitrust law also changes the incentives in this respect. A 
rational agent, aware that he would be incurring antitrust penalties, might decide ex-ante to adopt a closed Liuc Papers n. 114, ottobre 2002 
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architecture, or might decide not to integrate the products even when this would benefit efficiency. In 
both cases, the consequence would be an alteration of the system of incentives defined by copyright. This 
indicates a first point of conflict between the two statutory frameworks. 
A second point of conflict arises from the different direction of the laws. In the case of copyright, the 
system of incentives influences the behaviours of the owners of the rights. The latter are profit maximizer 
agents who pursue, as is normal, their own exclusive interests. Therefore it is reasonable to expect choices 
consistent with their objectives, including opting for creative solutions which are able to secure greater 
market power. The logic of attempting to secure market power is also what pushes owners to adopt 
differentiation strategies and is triggered by the nature of copyright, which confers a legal monopoly as a 
reward for innovation and is implicit in the information sector (Schmalensee, 2000). The system of 
property rights defined by copyright encourages owners to create a new product in exchange for a 
monopoly. Then-and inappropriately so, because it interferes with the self-same innovative process– 
antitrust law makes a value judgement on the new product which, because it is produced by the 
combination of two other products, is deemed to be potentially detrimental to competition. 
Nevertheless, the creation of market power is the reward promised by copyright to creators, and the 
potential disappearance of certain markets (for example that for browsers, which become a feature of the 
operating system) is implicit in the concept of innovation race.  Therefore, if for whatever reason we wish 
to alter the rational actions of the economic agents, in terms of their behaviours in response to a specific 
system of incentives, it is on the latter (i.e. the ‘incentives system’) that we must intervene. The use of 
antitrust law to correct the conceptual errors of copyright is in fact an inefficient (and costly) way of 
proceeding, and leads to a schizophrenic system that on the one hand encourages certain behaviours while 
on the other hand it punishes them.  
Within the domain of information goods, both due to the incentives created by copyright and the 
nature of the products themselves, tying has a strongly competitive dimension and has been generally 
accepted. In the case of  products different from software (music, literature, etc.), the fact of forcing 
consumers to acquire ‘tied’ or extended products has always been placidly accepted. When a consumer 
purchases a CD he is forced to purchase a set of songs, often in order to listen to only one of them. Such a 
purchase could in part damage the purchase of other songs. A similar argument could be made for a 
collection of novels, or for the chapters of a book on industrial economics. One might object that such a 
practice is made necessary by the technology which dictates a particular format for the “cans”
55. But such 
an assertion is debatable, also because the cans in question can be of different sizes.  
And in any case, given the technological trend toward the progressive disappearance of the physical 
medium, how are we to interpret such practices? A creator who wishes to continue selling combined 
products might for example define a group of songs as an original work of authorship (a sort of “suite”), 
and the tying  would disappear. Nor would it be feasible for an antitrust authority to order a separation of 
the components, as this would most probably infringe the right to integrity of the work which is one of the 
many rights (moral rights, in the case in point) that make up copyright.  Giovanni B. Ramello, Copyright and Antitrust Issues 
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If the above considerations, taken together, substantiate the existence of a conflict between copyright 
and antitrust law  with regard to tying, it is sufficiently clear that the resolution of this conflict in this 
setting must directly implicate copyright. 
5. Attempting to sketch out some general  policy guidelines 
In the previous sections we have shown how the system of rights and incentives created by copyright 
defines goods and rules of behaviour in such a way that the rule of competition does not prevail in those 
markets. The nature and goals of these practices  are often precariously balanced between legitimacy and 
unlawfulness. This renders their evaluation difficult and uncertain, even to the extent of producing 
unsatisfactory outcomes in terms of social welfare.  
However intervention by antitrust authorities only raises further questions with regard to effectiveness 
and results. Such actions can follow two different courses: law enforcement, i.e. detecting and penalising 
unlawful behaviours to restore competition, or regulation, i.e. altering the competitive scenario through 
structural decisions. Note that this second line of intervention is somewhat more complicated and, at least 
in the European system, subject to specific institutional restrictions
56. 
5.1 Restoring competition ? 
The first course, which is the most important and well-established in antitrust experience, presupposes 
the possibility of ascertaining unlawful behaviours. In fact, the results which economic theory considers 
inefficient, or at any rate indicative of limited competition, are not sufficient to presume the guiltiness. 
Antitrust decisions are judicial acts, and as such must be based on hard evidence or well founded charges 
of unlawful behaviours. This certainly constitutes a limitation, from the economic standpoint. But there 
are also other limitations, some of a general character and some specific to copyright. 
Let us consider for example the case of co-operative behaviours. As is known, agreements–
particularly if formal–are not very frequently discovered today. Antitrust must therefore operate in the 
grey area of tacit collusion. Now, ascertaining tacit collusion is particularly difficult, because it implies 
use of the “parallelism plus”  method which not only requires showing that the outcomes are compatible 
with a collusive scenario, but that they cannot be otherwise explained (ref. Yao and De Santi, 1993). Nor 
has economic analysis yet developed a sufficiently robust theory for describing how the firms in an 
oligopoly can set up facilitating devices
57. These circumstances create a certain degree of structural 
weakness for the general enforcement of antitrust. Since copyright industries are highly concentrated as a 
consequence of the legal incentive system, they are continually facing this ambiguous situation.  
In addition there are further complications specific to copyright. Consider for example the 
Fimi/Vendomusica
58  antitrust case in Italy, concerning agreements and concerted practices in the 
phonographic market, in which the 5 major labels were charged with price fixing and other cooperative 
behaviours. The verdict of the trial confirmed the accusations, inflicting a penalty on the firms involved, 
but without however addressing two crucial points. On the one hand, the behaviours in question were in 
any case consistent with the market structure defined by copyright, and therefore rational even in a Liuc Papers n. 114, ottobre 2002 
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context without agreements. In consequence, although the antitrust action could perhaps eliminate the 
agreements, it could not substantially alter the market result or its structural inefficiency. On the other 
hand, the international scale of the firms charged with collusion (a global oligopoly with CR5>80%) 
compared to the domestic scope of the antitrust proceeding and remedies – i.e. the Italian market- 
preclude any form of pro-competitive effectiveness.  
The other context in which law enforcement is applied is abuse of dominant position, and more 
specifically exclusionary practices, of which the Microsoft case has been the most sensational example. 
The difficulty of evaluating such practices in markets for information goods has been repeatedly pointed 
out in this paper. The monopoly granted to the owner of the copyright cannot in itself constitute a 
violation, nor can its proper exercise be considered a monopolisation attempt. Rather, the problem arises 
when a firm that has secured a dominant position in one market seeks to extend it to other markets, 
restraining competition. In this situation, however, the concepts of product, market and competition--as 
has been extensively discussed--are ambiguous and escape many of the standard theoretical 
classifications, which are based on paradigms developed for the traditional manufacturing industries.  
5.2 Regulating the market ? The uneasy case of the essential facility 
An interesting example of indirect regulation is the specific application of the essential facility 
doctrine within the sphere of antitrust intervention. This doctrine, defined within the context of public 
utilities, maintains that when a private resource becomes ‘essential’ for competition and cannot be 
duplicated by competitors, the antitrust authority under certain circumstances may force the owner to 
grant access to competitors on the grounds of the welfare-enhancing effects of competition itself
59. In 
general, the facility in question is a physical investment whose unlimited use is called into question by 
antitrust. 
The transposition to the copyright case is therefore based on the thesis that access to a given 
information good is often a crucial element for the existence of competition in a specific market, and 
might be exploited for effecting exclusionary practices against potential competitors.  Many antitrust 
cases have implicitly adopted the concept of essential facility for information goods, even though this 
principle has rarely been enunciated. 
In the Microsoft case, for example, the Windows operating system is treated de facto, although not de 
jure, as an essential facility for competition in the Internet browser market by the Federal Trade 
Commission (Cotter, 1999). Therefore, when the FTC adopts the remedy of forcing Microsoft to 
distribute W indows with included its own Explorer browser and the competing Netscape Navigator 
browser, it weakens the exclusive rights conferred by copyright to Bill Gates’ company, and which define 
a private property, in order to permit competition on the browser market in line with the precepts of the 
doctrine.  
Likewise, the follow-up of the Napster case, even given the uncertainty of the pre-trial phase, will still 
presumably hinge upon this concept, since the refusal of the major record labels to license their catalogue 
of phonograms for digital distribution effectively precludes access to an ‘essential and not readily 
duplicable’ facility for competition in the online music distribution market. Giovanni B. Ramello, Copyright and Antitrust Issues 
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In Europe, too, the concept of essential facility has been adopted--for the most part implicitly-in a 
number of measures. This has been the case for the many suits involving the pay-TV
60 industry, where the 
antitrust authorities have once again applied this doctrine, at least in substance if not in form, by forcing 
the licensing or limiting the exercise of monopoly power over certain premium content–such as 
blockbuster movies and key sports events--to which access is a necessary condition for contending the 
market (Nicita and Ramello, 2002).  
In a few rare cases, recourse to the essential facility doctrine has been explicit. One of these was the 
community NDC Health/IMS Health
61  case, in which the European Commission explicitly applied this 
theory to impose mandatory licensing of a data base in the pharmaceutical sector. 
This generalised lack of conviction by the antitrust authorities in explicitly espousing the essential 
facility doctrine in copyright markets gives further cause for thought. Even if this doctrine offers a 
practicable solution for stimulating competitive effects in these sectors, the question of advisability in 
adopting extensively such a doctrine is raised
62. As we have shown previously, copyright operates at the 
structural level, by defining property rights, whereas antitrust enforcement operates at the level o f 
behaviours. Now the emergence of inefficient behaviours in the markets for information goods depends in 
good measure on the system of incentives created by copyright. Therefore, a continuous recourse to 
essential facility – directly or indirectly, as it seems to be the case for copyright - can substantiate a sort of 
legal schizophrenia which on the one hand weakens competition to sustain innovation, and on the other 
hand penalizes innovation, violating the newly granted exclusive right in order to promote competition.  
Such a vicious circle does not promise efficient results.  
In addition, the antitrust authorities can only apply the essential facility principle ex-post, since it 
seeks to curb monopolistic positions created by copyright and reinforced by the particular conditions 
discussed previously. In this prospect, it can only have narrow and limited effects. Nor is it possible to 
propose an ex-ante action, as this would be in blatant violation of copyright law; neither can it be 
generalised, because this would eliminate the incentive to create, which is an essential part of copyright. 
Unlike the cases of public utilities, its non marginal application would be in direct conflict with an entire 
system of rights that have been artificially defined. 
5.3 Changing copyright? 
The direct route for avoiding or attenuating these inefficient outcomes is to alter copyright itself –i.e. 
to change the incentives system set up by the law-, reducing the degree of protection conferred especially 
in situations where the costs clearly outweigh the benefits. One model for implementing such a policy is 
already provided by the fair use doctrine (ref. Gordon and Bone, 1999), which permits the duplication of 
information goods without a license in certain specific circumstances.  
Innovation processes in contiguous markets, such as hardware or digital distribution, reinforce the 
stated position, based on the conviction that preserving broad scope for technological change is in the 
interests of consumers and society. Essentially, the dynamic process of discovery driven by individual 
self-interest represents another important dimension of the competition process, which makes it possible 
to introduce new products and new markets
63.  Now a firm which enjoys a strong dominant position in a Liuc Papers n. 114, ottobre 2002 
 
18 
copyright market might even control and direct innovation in contiguous industries. This in fact is the 
charge raised against the recording majors for digital distribution in the new Napster case (Picker, 2002).  
In contrast, technology today offers accessible solutions for the trade-off between competition and 
incentives: thanks to digital storage and communication systems, we can finally envisage a system of 
information that is freely accessible against payment of a fair royalty, avoiding the monopolisation of 
downstream markets (that is distribution) according to the model proposed by Arrow (1962). And hence 
the need to overhaul the copyright system also appears to be entrained by technological change.  
A number of recent theoretical developments bear out the idea that there can also be alternative 
systems for rewarding creators, which do not entail negative effects on competition
64.  
To summarise, if in the past the costs of the copyright system--also in term of reduced competition--
could find strong justification in light of the beneficial  effects on creative activities, today they are less 
acceptable both because there are new possibilities for rewarding creators and because they risk weighing 
down the competitive dynamics and the innovation process. Several scholars have also underlined the 
threat to competition and innovation which exists when intellectual property rights are over-broadly 
defined (Anderson, 1998).  
Therefore, all in all, the simplest measure to adopt for pursuing the goal of efficiency and minimising 
the negative impacts on competition is to reduce the burden of copyright where possible, paying a specific 
attention to the effects of this right on the market dynamics.  
We must in any case bear in mind that the institutional dynamic is a slow process, which in this 
context is further complicated by the existence of multilateral international conventions and agreements. 
And to this we must finally add the resistance by lobbies which are investing considerable sums to obtain 
measures that are exactly opposite of those proposed here. 
6. Conclusions 
This paper analyses the relationship between competition and copyright law. In particular, it examines 
the points of conflict which seem to create interferences between the two statutory frameworks. On the 
one hand copyright regulates the market by introducing, as a solution for achieving its welfare enhancing 
aim, incentives and constraints which limit competition and constitute a second best. On the other hand, 
competition law and antitrust attempt to direct markets toward their first best solution, eliminating all 
possible obstacles to competition. This structural diversity creates a dialectic between the two frameworks 
which does not appear rectifiable. There are in fact specific characteristics of information goods and 
specific incentives created by copyright which lead to the emergence of inefficient behaviours in this 
context. The penalisation of such behaviours by the antitrust authority, in cases where they are found to 
be unlawful, would in any case have only doubtful effects on the competitive dynamic, whereas it would 
definitely impact on the system of incentives created by copyright, altering it. In certain cases it is 
possible to use the essential facility doctrine for effecting targeted actions, but such a practice constitutes 
an infringement of property rights and is therefore in conflict with copyright. Giovanni B. Ramello, Copyright and Antitrust Issues 
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Moreover, the national scale of antitrust intervention conflicts with the international scope of the 
copyright industries, raising an issue of inconsistency. 
It is also interesting to note how technological change is concurrently altering the structure of the 
markets, weakening and at times eliminating certain strategic elements crucial to the monopolistic 
exercise of copyright, such as c ontrol over distribution networks. In light of this observation, the 
previously mentioned suits-the Microsoft case and the Napster case in its antitrust aspects-can be 
interpreted as an initial outcome of this change, in the sense that the alteration of the industrial 
configuration, exogenous for the purposes of the behaviours of copyright owners, pushes them to expose 
the anticompetitive aspects of their strategies and puts them more clearly--when this is the case--in a 
position of unlawfulness. 
Given this scenario, an acceptable antitrust policy for the information goods sector would appear to be 
one of minimum, contingent and non systematic intervention, which does not attempt to steer 
technological change and does not propose a different and contradictory system of incentives. A corollary 
to this assertion is the observation that, if effects detrimental to efficiency exist, these arise for the most 
part from the system created by copyright. Therefore, the rule of reason suggests that, when this is 
necessary, we should intervene principally on copyright itself, taking care not to further aggravate its 
negative effects. 
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